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Investigating the Truths: Inquiries,
Conspiracies and Implied
Performances in the Public Record
Graham White
The web of conspiracy is always more or less finely woven than what
we do perceive of it (Mailer 1983: 9).

The focus in courtrooms or tribunal chambers on live witness
evidence-giving is examined in literature dealing with the residue of
legal encounters as a space of potential instability for the process of
establishing narrative authority (Auslander 1999; Lynch and Bogen
1996; TDR 2008). These accounts focus on the self-conscious ‘play’
of witness performance — self-presentation, demeanour and verbal
and physical fluency as the site of a particular, intractable form of
challenge to attempts to construct a definitive legal record. In this
essay I will examine some instances in which historically prominent
legal proceedings have proved fertile ground for challenges to
official narratives through the tendentious reconstruction of such
witness performance as implied by the written record. This kind of
reconstruction is a common feature of a body of conspiracy theories
which read ‘against the grain’ of official narratives.
David Coady (2003) defines conspiracy theory as ‘a proposed
explanation of an historical event in which conspiracy … has a
significant casual role … to bring about the historical event which
it purports to explain’ and which must ‘conflict with an “official”
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explanation of the same historical event’ (Coady 2003: 201). In their
return to the moment of performance to assert a version of what ‘really’
occurred, the conspiracy theories I am concerned with reinterpret the
record of the trial or hearing in order to reveal its ‘true’ significance,
one which is generally held to be hidden in plain sight.
I will be seeking to identify three particular models of implied
performance which focus on differing aspects of legal proceedings. The
cases I will be using as illustration are all American in this instance,
and I encountered them as literary and electronic texts rather than
live testimonial events. The American focus is by coincidence rather
than design, notwithstanding that the public reckonings involved —
the Warren Commission’s report into the Assassination of President
Kennedy, the Kean Commission’s Hearings into 9/11 and the 1951 trial
and subsequent execution of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg — amount to
foundational texts in the history of conspiracy theorising from both
ends of the political spectrum. In their narrative content they also act
as arresting engagements with the cloudy nightmares of threat and
state action that haunt a national psyche — political assassination,
terrorism, domestic subversion.

In the final section of the essay I examine some of the overlaps
between this mining of implied performance from the record and
the strategies employed by documentary theatre as it too fixes on the
trial transcript in order to represent it. For a theatrical representation
of a legal encounter, both the textual record and the spectacle of
the physical proceedings of the courtroom must be ‘edited’ and
reimagined. Questions of interpretation thus immediately arise — what
is appropriate to the representation of the truth of proceedings, whose
voices, which exchanges, what of the materiality of the courtroom
space should appear? Debates on the efficacy of this theatrical form
tend to circle around the issue of verisimilitude. Some commentators
suggest that the unproblematic representation of a staged ‘real’ fails to
acknowledge the representational processes involved in its reproduction
and, thus, fails to do justice to the complexity of the event’s truths or
the partiality of the interpreter’s perspectives. I would suggest that such

338

Investigating the Truths

theatrical representations have intriguing similarities to the process of
conspiracy theorising which builds on implied performance in order
to assert the affective power of its interpretation.

Conspiracies and Theories
Critical explorations of conspiracy theories suggest that they are a form
of analysis which builds on postmodern doubt concerning the ability
to gain purchase on complex and dislocating events. In his outlining
of a model, Frederic Jameson (1988) asserts that:
Conspiracy is the poor person’s cognitive mapping in the postmodern
age; it is a degraded figure of the total logic of late capital, a desperate
attempt to represent the latter’s system, whose failure is marked by its
slippage into sheer theme and content (Jameson 1988: 355).

In the context of such ‘desperate attempts’, the localised and specific
episode of courtroom performance (performance here considered as
managed self-presentation, deliberately reconstituted activity intended
to affect or mislead) may be read as an originating, primal scene in
which proliferating narratives and power structures are revealed
and thus understood. These emerge from unseen networks into the
accidental and unintended revelation of their deep structures. It is worth
noting here that in examining the conspiracy theorist’s work we must be
careful to observe our own implication in the process. As Martin Parker
(2001) points out, the writer dealing with this topic must be conscious
of their role in identifying and clarifying a conspiracy, surmising and
confirming that the ‘patient is paranoid, falsely conscious, playfully
ref lexive’, that they are enmeshed in a post-modern blurring of
discourses and distinctions and that conspiracy is the problem to which
truth is the answer (Parker 2001: 200). Parker goes on to suggest that
such scepticism is the foundational ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ at the
heart of all human sciences, and that we are all, more or less, theorists of
conspiracies (202). Mark Fenster (2008) also illustrates the undeniable
historical reality of conspiracy, indicating that conspiracy theories can
‘correctly identify present and historical wrongs’ and that they are a
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constituent element of much political process (Fenster 2008: 11). At
the same time, his analysis focuses most strongly on conspiracy theory’s
manifest extremes, suggesting that it ‘is frequently wrong — and
outrageously, even seemingly pathologically so, at times’ (11).

Conspiracy theories seek gaps, omissions and slippages in the
documentation of official processes and procedures. When they fix on
those elements of performance — demeanour, behaviour, mimesis,
enactment — which cannot themselves be ‘fixed’, which disappear
with the ephemeral shift of performance, they occupy fertile ground.
The case studies examined below each feature a prominent potential
or claimed conspiracy theory which rests on the analysis of a moment
of human performance in a legal context. In doing so, each theory
employs a form of analytical performative writing to assert a slippage
between the apparently explicit text — written or visually recorded —
of testimony and its supposed subtextual content.
I characterise such themes as operating through three distinct and
identifiable forms of implied performance:
a) The ascription of particular performative underpinnings to a
dialogue available only as the written transcript of testimony.
b) The examination and interpretation of performance
which is available both as text and as video record so as to
recontextualise the particularity of that performance. Here,
performance is not reinvented, but reinterpreted.

c) The outlining of the implied demeanour of participants
through embellishment of third party witness recall in
instances where no transcript exists, or by the ascription
of entirely imagined elements of performance where no
account exists but witnesses are known to have been present
to provide some form of ‘audience’ to activities subsequently
written up as performance. In such cases the writer is
generally not themselves an eyewitness to what went on.

In exploring the following examples in which an implied
performance has become central to a conspiracy theory, I will thus be
outlining the ways in which each provides a similar but qualitatively
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different example of the process.

Oswald, Kennedy and the Proliferation of Doubt
An example of the first form of implied performance — the ascription
of particular performative underpinnings to a dialogue available
only as written transcript — occurs in the reinterpretation of the
events surrounding the investigation of the assassination of President
John F Kennedy by the Warren Commission Inquiry in 1964. Mark
Lane’s (1967) influential account of the evidence given by Jack Ruby
(the killer of Kennedy’s alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald) to the
Commission focused on Ruby’s speech and behaviour when giving
evidence as revelatory of his involvement in a conspiratorial plot.
Here, the transcript of Ruby’s interrogation is read for its sub-textual
significance, with meaning hinted at, but hidden:
RUBY: But you are the only one that can save me. I think you can.
WARREN: Yes?
RUBY: But by delaying minutes, you lose the chance. And all I want
to do is tell the truth, and that is all (Lane 1967: 236).

For Lane, Ruby is a witness with evidence of a conspiracy who is
unable to speak about that conspiracy unless he is taken to Washington.
He is fearful, uncertain, seeking support for his insinuations and
anxious to go further if the conditions are right. In Lane’s commentary
Ruby is dropping signals that refer to what is, and must remain, unsaid
- making for an expressive picture of the self-presentation of a hounded,
disturbed individual seeking escape.

However, as Jean Davison’s (1983) later account suggests, this
reading of an implied performative demeanour from the textual account
is tendentious. In her book, Oswald’s Game, Davison provides an
indication of the ways in which the record has become a ‘lumberyard’
in which ‘by picking up a few pieces here and there, and doing some
cutting and fitting, any theory could be built for which someone had
a blueprint’ (Davison 1983: 19). Davison examines Lane’s account of
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the apparent fear of assassination manifested in Jack Ruby’s interview.
In this, Lane suggests that Ruby felt he could not tell the truth in the
current location, and was dropping heavy hints that if he could be
moved to Washington he would be able to reveal all. That he wasn’t
moved was evidence, to Lane, that the Commission didn’t want what
he had to say to become public. Lane makes much of the implications
of Ruby’s statements from the transcript, a transcript which Davison
describes as reading ‘like a play’. However, as Davison discovers
on reading and reconstructing the text in greater detail, Lane’s
interpretation of the play text’s performance is a clear mis-reading. In
fact, she argues, Ruby appears anxious to reveal that he was not part
of a conspiracy, and his reason for going to Washington is to take a
lie detector test prove this, so removing him from what he sees as an
increasingly anti-Semitic attempt to frame him.

Davison’s re-reading of Lane’s own version of the interview
transcript foregrounds the difficulty of establishing a factitiously
reliable record of witness testimony without documentation of the
witness’s behaviour — that aspect of witness contribution which in
legal terms is defined as demeanour — to support it. In this case we
are concerned with a lack, an absence, and the influence on the record
of that absence, allowing interpretation to play across the surface of
recorded testimony to establish doubt and explore the possibility of
judicial misinterpretation, avoidance or intentional deceit. Ruby’s
performance is presented by Lane as suggestive of the failings of the
Warren Commission to provide an adequate account of what took
place. In this case the image of a distracted, troubled witness, hinting
at secrets, is edited from the available record to provide evidentiary
fit, and remains as the ghosted impression assembled by Lane while
the associated materials decay. The inscription of new performance
is enough to indicate the existence of doubt, and that is also enough
to assert this doubt over any claim to the validity of the official
investigation.
The absence of a record of Ruby’s ‘performance’ in such an instance,
and the embellishment of the transcript through an implied one,
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highlights the awkward position of the demeanour of witnesses in
courtroom procedures. The reading of such demeanour is a crucial
element of judicial processes, founded in the ability to command the
presence of the witness for judge, counsel and jury to both interrogate
the witness’s recalled experience and to evaluate the manner of the
witness’es self-presentation. Here, demeanour is registered as an
unexamined standard, a generalised concept which seems to take
in diction, deportment, physical presentation, cosmetic appearance,
attention, stance and many other signifying elements aimed at a
normative standard of truthful behaviour. The fact that witnesses
and defendants might still present themselves ‘untruthfully’ through
a skilled playing indicates the degree to which such a common sense
reading may be subverted, and yet it is also apparent that the affective
impact of the courtroom encounter holds a persuasive power akin to
that of the most accomplished mimetic theatrical representation.

9/11, Air Defence and the Playing of Operational
Responsibility — Performance as Evasion and
Diversion
The second form of implied performance constructed as evidence of
conspiracy that I wish to present involves more developed transcription.
It can be seen at work in the US Government’s investigation into the
events of 9/11. This examination and interpretation of performance is
based on the availability of testimony as both text and video record.
Where the transcription of evidence and of judicial process seeks to
prevent interpretive openness, it generally does so as part of a project
aimed at reducing doubt concerning the authority of legal conclusions
drawn from the courtroom proceedings, illustrating the material limits
of circumstances in order to prevent the escalation of counter-narrative
and conspiracy.1 The advent of the supposedly protective authority of
the video record would seem to provide a rooted basis for the revealed
nature of courtroom truths. However, cases in which this process in
fact provokes forms of performance analysis that are instrumental to
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the construction of larger narratives of conspiracy illustrate that specific
theories may find confirmation through their ability to reexamine
specific courtroom performances.
During the Public Hearings into the Kean Commission’s Report
on 9/11 in the US, accusations were made concerning the testimony
of military witnesses involved in air force defence on the day. These
suggested that their public statements about decisions taken regarding
hijacked aircraft were contradicted by tape recordings of their actual
behaviour. Major General Larry Arnold and Colonel Alan Scott,
representatives of the North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD), first testified to Kean’s panel hearing in May 2003 and
Arnold returned to the Public Hearing in June 2004 to hear the
Commission’s statement regarding the improvised air defence on
the day and to face questions arising. This testimony has been mined
during subsequent commentary for discrepancies focusing not only on
factual elements, but also on the performative — asserting that Arnold’s
statements make a series of rhetorical gestures which supplement their
explicit content and also that his demeanour in the performance of
his testimony before the Commission exposed the supposed untruths
and subtextual voicings through particular hesitations and emphases.

Arnold’s second testimony was to an open hearing of the
Commission, in response to the report compiled by staff researchers
on the response of the air force on the morning of 9/11 in which his
previous evidence was cited. The researchers had found that NORAD
officials, including Arnold, declared in their initial appearance at the
Hearings, that they received hijack notification regarding Flights
United 93 and American 77 at 9.16 am and 9.24 am respectively
on the day. They claimed they had scrambled fighters from Langley
airforce base directly in response to these warnings. The researchers’
own analysis suggested that this was not the case and that such
‘inaccurate accounts of what happened … deflected questions about
the military’s capacity to obtain timely and accurate information from
its own resources’ (Farmer et al nd: 19).2 Discovery of further bodies
of material allowed the researchers to reconstruct discrepancies that
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countered the version of an ordered military response put forward at
the May hearing and in Leslie Filson’s official NORAD account, Air
War Over America: Sept 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission (for which
Arnold provided the Foreword).

When Arnold returned in 2004 to give testimony concerning his
own earlier statements he was asked why no one from his organisation
had mentioned false and inaccurate reports of aircraft situations which
occurred on 9/11 at the previous hearings. He was also asked why no
mention had been made of open line recordings of communications
between various airbases, control centres and commanders which
illustrated that NORAD’s response was confused, and not considered
and controlled as he’d previously testified. In response, Arnold resorted
to describing a failed memory process:
I didn’t recall those facts in May of last year. That’s the correct answer
to that. In fact, as I recall, during that time frame, my concern was why
did — the question that came to me was, ‘Why did we scramble the
aircraft out of Langley Air Force Base, the F-16s out of Langley Air
Force Base?’… and I was trying to remember in my own mind, what
it was that persuaded us to scramble those aircraft …’3

Arnold’s strategy was to return to the moment of recall before the
Commission in May 2003 and to try to reconstruct the live memory
searching which took place at that point. In doing so, he positioned
himself as a rather fumbling individual caught up in public events
— both on 9/11 and in front of the Commission — presenting this
individual lack of acuity to deflect the suggestion of misrepresentation
by the body he represented — NORAD.

At face value this would seem to be unprofessional, but hardly
conspiratorial. However, Arnold’s strategy of befuddlement on
his second appearance has not closed down the avenues of inquiry
into Government collusion in 9/11. His second testimony has been
repeatedly re-examined and re-narrated for its playing into the narrative
frame of a conspiracy on the part of the whole Kean Commission
exercise — by staff researchers and Committee members as well as
the witnesses and NORAD. Arnold’s original testimony becomes a
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key element of conspiracy theories which claim that the Kean Report
is a revisionist one seeking to deflect attention from Government’s
complicity in the attacks. Here, Arnold’s performance on his return
to the Commission is the final proof that the Commission is engaged
in a rewriting of what actually happened. David Ray Griffin’s online
account suggests that Arnold’s recall of his memory failure is presented
as a deliberate enactment of a failure to remember ‘the future — that
is … not “remembering” a story that had been invented only after
he had given his testimony’ (Griffin nd).4 Thus, the ‘story’ told by
Arnold of scrambling fighters to intercept Flight 77 is a fiction of
the Commission’s own making, one Arnold should have originally
remembered and parroted to the Commission on his first appearance.5

According to Griffin, Arnold’s return was an opportunity provided
by the Commission to allow him to revisit his mistake in order to point
to it and so to support the Commission’s deception — something he
managed to do and would have got away with were it not for the sharp
eyes of Griffin himself. For Griffin, Arnold’s failure to remember the
alleged facts in May could not be credible because it would mean that
Arnold’s force failed to scramble in response to all the hijacked aircraft,
only becoming airborne in response to a false report. Such a revelation
would, in Griffin’s words, be ‘the biggest embarrassment of Arnold’s
professional life’, and is not one he would have presented willingly. 6
For the Commission, Arnold’s second testimonial appearance became
proof of an attempt to mislead in order to smooth his organisation’s
error-strewn performance. For Griffin, it was even more manipulative;
not the self-defence of the incompetent searching for a believable excuse
for error but the deliberately composed faking of such a defence as part
of a strategy of disinformation. Griffin reads it as mimetic, a staged
enactment of memory recall that seeks to account for his past certainty
being disturbed. For both, Arnold’s performance was an uncomfortable
and awkward moment of revelation, although one that indicates very
different kinds, and degrees of, conspiracy. In this case, testimony and its
enactment are presented as expressing truths other than those spoken, as
productive spaces for the exploration of apparent narrative discordance.
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The Rosenbergs - Implied Performance as
Confirmatory Embellishment
The third form of implied performance I wish to examine is of a rather
different nature, focusing as it does on the demeanour of participants
through embellishment of third party witness recall in instances where
no transcript exists, or through the ascription of entirely imagined
elements of performance where no direct account exists. While
demeanour on the stand may be an element in the passing of judgment,
the wider context of narratives circulating around a trial — through
press, TV, radio and online media — tends to focus on the social and
personal circumstances surrounding the event. Here the generic codes
involved may be seeking to maximise the dramatic impact of personal
witness and encounter.

This process can be seen at work in another celebrated and
controversial case of North American conspiracy — the trial and
execution for espionage of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. In this case, the
assertion of conspiracy — either a conspiracy by spies or a conspiracy
by the authorities — weaves in and around the official record, with
some embellished narratives supporting it and some opposing it. Here
we move away from official notation and transcription of proceedings
or testimony given under oath and into a realm of documentation at
the margins of the official process — journalistic encounters with
witnesses, notes and reports of surveillance, eyewitness accounts that do
not appear as part of the official investigation, but rather as addendum,
for example, material perhaps sold on or discovered subsequent to the
official business of the case. These may have come from members of
the public who witnessed elements of the case, agents involved in the
activities that produced the evidence against defendants, or journalists
and novelists watching and documenting the drama of these occasions.
They are frequently the core documents of revisionism, and are a catalyst
for the slipping of all originating moments into an historiography of
conspiracy.
In the ongoing debate over the nature and detail of Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg’s spying for the Soviet Union during the 1940s, for which
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they were both executed in 1953, discussion of their involvement or
otherwise has moved between the contradictions and complexities of
the court evidence and reinterpretations of the case through research,
publication and disclosure of classified documents. Accounts of the
Rosenbergs’ guilt often pursue a melodramatic line, speculatively
capturing performance in peculiarly heated, revelatory moments
and attempting to inscribe it as indicative of degeneracy, conspiracy
and sedition. For example, Louis Nizer (1973) describes the only
meeting between the detained Rosenbergs to take place without
a partitioning screen. Here the author’s depiction of the meeting
extrapolates an implied performance from the scene and imagines a
potent demonstration of the extremities of the personalities involved, as
witnessed by an unprepared, shocked audience of prison staff. For Nizer,
Ethel and Julius Rosenberg reveal an unguarded and unmanipulated
image of themselves in this encounter that he suggests isall the more
revelatory for its spontaneity.
Before anyone knew what was happening, they began pawing one
another with wild abandon. They lost all control and wrestled
passionately. The witnesses to the scene were stunned by the suddenness
and violence of the outburst. They looked on in amazement at the
writhing, groaning figures … [Then, when they were separated] …
Ethel pulled her shirt together in a modest gesture which seemed
ludicrous under the circumstances. She pulled her skirt down and
demurely patted her dishevelled hair’(Nizer 1973: 395-6).

This book led to a defamation suit from the Rosenberg’s orphaned
children (by then adults, their names changed to that of their adoptive
parents) in the 1970s. A central point in their suit involved Nizer’s
dramatic rendering of another imagined scene.. In his account of
Michael Rosenberg’s response to a newsflash of the President’s refusal
of his parent’s final appeal, Nizer presents the boy giving out ‘a fearful
scream like those that ejected him from his nightmares’. The boy’s
agonised is rendered as the despair as dramatic climax of the case. In
the children’s lawsuit the same moment is presented directly contrasting
tones; Here the ‘Plaintiff sat quietly with his hands folded looking
down. Plaintiff did not cry’.7 In this episode, the Rosenberg’s suit
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asserts that it is Nizer’s construction of an implied performance which
is part of a conspiracy.

The Rosenbergs sons’ suit failed, it being found that there was no
reckless or malicious disregard for the truth in Nizer’s work, ‘the literary
and historical worth and accuracy of Nizer’s account’ not being an issue
for the court ‘however important they may be to the appellants’. This
raises an important issue regarding the literary artifice surrounding such
narrative interventions and accounts. The nature of Nizer’s reading of
the critical construction of identity and demeanour is presented within
the judgment as fair comment, a legitimate fictional embellishment of
the known facts which tends to the truthful. It is this ‘tending’ which
is important here. With the establishment of guilt, the portrayal of
behaviour consistent with the monstrosity that such guilt implies,
becomes reasonable, and an associate of ‘truth’. Literary quality is a
quite different category from truthfulness but, for the Rosenbergs, it
offered a conspiratorial reinforcing of an official lie. In this instance the
genre codes of literary journalism and its shading into literary fiction
amplify, enhance and dramatise the legalistic narrative surrounding the
court case, establishing a degree of embellishment which interposes the
sensational into the record’s formality and presenting the meaning of
human behaviour through the legitimating frame of the case’s outcome.
It is the arrival at a record of judgment that allows for the pursuit of a
particular quality of implied performance.

Representing the Court
In excavating the record — generally in order to reveal an apparent
contradiction, omission or misrepresentation drawn upon in the
officially sanctioned version of events — the revisionist seeks a variety of
evidential support. In these instances the locating of a primary moment,
such as eyewitness testimony that has been overlooked, will often
provide the support that moves a revisionist account from the theoretical
to the empirical, dismantling the sense of conspiratorial theorising
replace it with apparently prosecutable fact. However, where a criminal
trial may demand the presence of witnesses and accused in order to
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judge the quality of their demeanour, the revisionist examination of
the record may assert that its judgment of the significance of human
performance from the transcript and the documentation surrounding
the trial is equally authoritative — if not in front of the court, then
at least in front of the general public. The theory’s fix on a moment of
performance which provides evidence of the originating generation of
doubt is frequently the crucial support to a performative assertion of
the failings of an official record.

In focusing on such revelatory moments of performance, the
conspiracy theory becomes a form of performative writing — the
marshalling of evidence into a persuasive narrative as a project which
follows on the initial declaration of doubt. If we take the example of
Lane’s analysis of Ruby’s evidence, we see the performative evocation of
performance. The interpretation of Ruby’s demeanour during testimony
is constructed only through the invention of Lane’s script. Similarly,
if we examine Griffin’s account of Arnold’s testimony, we are being
asked to consider the moment of witness hesitation as evidence of a
failure of scripting in the moment of performance. In Nizer’s account
of the Rosenberg’s meeting we are confronted with the performative
assertion of disgust at deception, and with the Rosenberg’s demeanour
on the stand illustrating of the exact opposite of its apparently manifest
content.
Each of these instances of the extrapolation of implied performance
from the written record is grounded in a tense relationship with the
idea of the record itself as a source of ‘truth’. Each holds that the record
exists as the capturing of a moment, but suggests that this capturing
is only partial. Lane edits the transcript to reveal an interpretation
which fits with the theory being advanced, though he does not dispute
the validity of the transcript. Griffin reinterprets the visual record of
a performance to reveal its lack of truthfulness, again in accordance
with the theory being put forward, and again without contesting the
validity of the record as a documentation of what ‘happened’. Nizer
reworks the record of an incident through literary tropes, framing the
account as melodrama. In doing so, each writer attaches the genre
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codes of conspiracy theory — of secrecy and revelation, treacherous
characters, dramatic and suspenseful confrontations, to the basic,
unadorned record.

This perhaps raises the question of how far that record itself is a
literary construct, albeit one which claims a particular realist integrity.
Legal dialogue is never innocent of narrative intent, of constructing
a teleology through its use of the rhetorics of cross-examination and
archly structured modes of persuasion. The verbatim transcript of an
interview such as Jack Ruby’s is a genre which has itself been shown to
be susceptible to fictionalising strategies — the reason why all British
police interviews are routinely recorded. I have elsewhere written on the
truth-effects of witness evidence-giving in prominent trials, considering
aspects of what it is that amounts to the impression of the authentic,
or the ‘real’. in the giving of testimony and in its interpretation, in
particular where contrasting accounts are not clearly separable by
other forms of evidence. However, my concern here is not to examine
the perception of the real or of ‘realism’ in various genres and social
phenomena. Rather, I am interested in outlining the strategies by
which implied performance often becomes the seal of authenticity
for the truth-effect of these interpretations. It is by claiming the
affective interpretation of the truth of a performative supplement to
the language captured in the textual record that these theories find
the key to conspiracy.
The interpolation of the performed into the space between transcript
and audience (a category covered in courtrooms by the defining of
demeanour and the ‘lost’ recording of its particularity and qualities), is
replaced in conspiracy theories by the implied demeanour drawn from
verbal and or physical interactions, and by the confident normalising
of linguistic delivery as slippery. Language is read in legal proceedings
as having a demeanour of its own — polished, precise and fluent
delivery of evidence all indicators of probable plausibility, facticity and
truth. In the reading of implied performance, spoken language is often
presented as necessarily obfuscatory, something to inspire distrust. As
a result, the absence of the performative in the official record becomes
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the site for the conspiracy theorist of a loss of signification, hinting
at the impossibility of the conspiracy remaining hidden. Gaps, holes,
contradictions, absences, aporia are the stuff of conspiracy — the things
which, the conspiracy theorist contends, the official record must try to
cover up, though it can never adequately do so.

One of the key tropes of the forms of tribunal theatre which
have become a popular contemporary theatrical form is the setting
of theatre as a mode of documentation, in which the events being
replayed may be rendered as a persuasive representation of surface
reality — with surroundings and performance paying great attention
to the detailed reproduction of physical circumstances, appearance
and, in actor’s performances, demeanour. In the public stature of a
theatre such as the Tricycle in London’s Kilburn, which has produced
a string of verbatim dramatisations of landmark tribunals and trials,
this stands as an arresting addition to the model of written, video,
journalistic or eyewitness records which surround the space of the legal
encounter.8However, the commitment to a playing of the ‘real’ in such
work is read by Stephen Bottoms (2006) as intensely problematic —
he asserts that documentary drama is bedevilled by a mimetic realism
which fails to acknowledge reflexively the process of its construction
(Bottoms 2006: 56-68).
It is an irony of this mode of representation that it lights often on
the affective power of performance, detailing and replaying a fluid
version of it and yet, by the same token, asserting that the record
of proceedings is a fixed and unmoving thing. Onstage, the judge’s
chair stands in for the judge’s chair in the courtroom, the transcript
being played before the audience stands in for the transcript being
recorded in court, yet the actor playing the role of the witness provides
a performative approximation of the delivery of evidence and may,
sometimes, provide a very broad caricature. The tribunal play necessarily
becomes a tendentious examination, both of evidence and of the nature
of the real — one which performs a socially significant function, but
which also suggests that there is an interpretive play in the record
which is resistant to this claim to representational certainty. Bottoms’
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analysis suggests that the dramatic and theatrical text — which
openly acknowledges its partial and constructed nature — may be the
one which more effectively embodies the complex and multifarious
truths of the record’s relation to the shifting mass of events, motives
and experiences which it interprets than the realist account, for all its
surface truth. The revelation of the emotive moment of human action
at the core of the courtroom scene is itself an extracting of implied
performance from the record, one which will enhance the affective
power of a tendentious interpretation.9

Conclusion
Conspiracy theories frequently construct implied performances from
the written or otherwise documented record of official legal proceedings
in order to provide an affective account of a core gap in that record, a
gap which is revelatory of the conspiracy they seek to prove. Having
illustrated the ways in which some significant conspiracy theories have
engaged with the space of performance surrounding witness evidence
giving and demeanour, I have suggested that this taking hold of a
performance trace in order to prove conspiracy shares ground with
the manner in which documentary theatre practices may seek to fix
interpretation of the record in performance so as to support a particular
reading of the meanings of the court proceedings. In doing so, both
indicate that demeanour and witness performance, resistant to capture
in the written record of the trial, resurfaces as a peculiarly powerful and
affective support to the tendentious interpretation of the written record.

Notes
1

The Coroner conducting the Inquest into the Deaths of Princess Diana
and Dodi Al-Fayed in London in 2007-08 has described the wide-ranging
nature of the courtroom proceedings as an attempt to do just this. See www.
scott-bakerinquests, especially in his response to Sir Richard Dearlove,
ex-head of the British Secret Intelligence Service, who challenged him
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2

3

4
5

6
7

8

regarding the wide-ranging nature of the inquest. See www.scottbakerinquests.gov.uk/hearing_transcripts/200208am.htm: 79, lines 15-24

John Farmer et al (nd) Improvising a Homeland Defense, Staff Statement
No 17, Commission on Terrorist Attacks: 19 at www.9-11commission.gov/
staff_statements/staff_statement_17.pdf

Major General Larry Arnold (Thursday 17 June 2004) Testimony to the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, Twelfth
Public Hearing, Washington DC at: www.govinfo.library.unt.edu/ 911/
archive/hearing12/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-06-17.htm
David Ray Griffin (nd) ‘The 9/11 Commission’s Incredible Tales’ posted
on www.lookingglassnews.org accessed 14 December 2009

The conspiracy theory suggests that this fiction was created by the
Commission to cover its discovery that in fact Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) technicians imagined another flight, number 11,
was still airborne and heading for Washington for 35 minutes after it had
crashed into the World Trade Center. The theory maintains that it was this
‘ghost’ flight that the scrambled planes were intended to intercept rather
than Flight 77.
Griffin (nd) op cit

From Smith, Circuit Judge, 1977. Michael Meeropol and Robert Meeropol vs
Louis Nizer, Doubleday and Co, Inc and Fawcett Publications Inc, United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 560 F.2d 1061, 19 May
1977 Available at www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/rosenb/
ROS_CT5.HTM
Tribunal plays produced at the Tricycle include Richard Norton-Taylor and
John McGrath eds Half the Picture: The Scott Arms to Iraq Inquiry (1994);
Richard Norton-Taylor ed Nuremburg (1996), The Colour of Justice: The
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (1999), Justifying The War, Scenes from the Hutton
Inquiry (2003), Bloody Sunday: Scenes from the Saville Tribunal (2005); and
Nicholas Kent ed Srebrenica (1996). For an account of the importance of
this work, notwithstanding my own recurrent concerns, see Paola Botham
2009 ‘Witnesses in the Public Sphere: Bloody Sunday and the Redefinition
of Political Theatre’ in Haedicke, Heddon, Oz and Westlake eds 2009
Political Performances: Theory and Practice Rodopi New York.
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9

Although David Hare’s reading of the impact and significance of Richard
Norton-Taylor’s 1999 edited text of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, The
Colour of Justice, quoted by Janelle Reinelt in the same edition of The Drama
Review (Reinelt, 2006: 81) is an eloquent summary of how the verbatim
text might weave its insightful effects without that self-reflexive structuring
that Stephen Bottoms (2006) seeks.
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